conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …

establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the …

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with … addition, we give an elementary proof that robustness to incomplete information implies noise independence. …

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with … players or actions. In addition, we give an elementary proof that robustness to incomplete information implies noise …

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with … addition, we give an elementary proof that robustness to incomplete information implies noise independence. …

. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se … fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information because its potential to serve as a … focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of public announcements. This paper shows that public information …

. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se … fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information because its potential to serve as a … focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of public announcements. This paper shows that public information …

conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …

conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …