In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … reasoning. Stated second order beliefs indicate that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about …

over-react to announcements, but not as much as what is theoretically predicted in models based on public information that …

, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper …

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under limited levels of reasoning and …

This paper reconsiders the principal's problem of determining the optimal combination of risk taking and information … certain threshold, the central bank respectively the firm should commit to maximal risk and to disclosing private information … and to disseminate private information of lowest possible precision …

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely … the coordination component in a player's utility increases, players put more weight on the public signal when making their …

welfare if coordination is socially desirable. -- coordination games ; strategic uncertainty ; private information ; public …In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely …

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with … addition, we give an elementary proof that robustness to incomplete information implies noise independence. -- global games …

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under such limited levels of reasoning and …

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … reasoning. Stated second order beliefs indicate that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about …