In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely behavior of others. We present an experiment in which...

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure, which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

Le modèle de Morris et Shin [2002] montre que des annonces publiques imprécises peuvent coordonner les spéculateurs loin de la solution fondamentale par un phénomène de sur-réaction aux annonces. Le fort potentiel focal exercé par la connaissance commune est dommageable au bien-être...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely behavior of others. We present an experiment in which...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure, which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...