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Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik - 2017

mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in … essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the … characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753387

Instability of belief-free equilibria

Heller, Yuval - 2017

Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011579494

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences : Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

Heller, Yuval - 2018

We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937798

Language, Meaning, and Games : A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Heller, Yuval - 2014

Demichelis and Weibull (2008 AER) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014154176

Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk-Dove Games

Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon - 2021

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: asymmetric pure equilibria in which players in one population play ‘hawk’ and players in the other population play ‘dove’, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models show that populations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220368

Naive Analytics Equilibrium

Berman, Ron; Heller, Yuval - 2021

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best responses to one another. Under the ensuing equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236390

Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games

Heller, Yuval - 2011

In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many instances to act even though the duration of interactions take a relatively short time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134617

Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values

Heller, Yuval - 2020

We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Renegotiation-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847894

Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values

Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2021

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210917

Three steps ahead

Heller, Yuval - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258924