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Observations on cooperation
Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik - 2017
mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in … essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the … characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753387
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258924
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evolutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in finitely repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259605
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Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Milchtaich, Igal - In: Journal of economic theory 197 (2021), pp. 1-24
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012815449
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Observations on cooperation
Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik - In: The review of economic studies 85 (2018) 4/305, pp. 2253-2282
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263376
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241
limited foresight, and as a new mechanism to induce cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599539
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Observations on cooperation
Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik - 2017
mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in … essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the … characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057421
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Instability of belief-free equilibria
Heller, Yuval - 2017
Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011785712
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The endowment effect as blessing
Frenkel, Sivan; Heller, Yuval; Teper, Roee - 2017
We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. We suggest that the "endowment effect" and the "winner's curse" could have jointly survived natural selection together. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011785717
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Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games
Heller, Yuval - 2011
In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many instances to act even though the duration of interactions take a relatively short time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134617