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Hendricks, Kenneth; Porter, Robert H. - 2013

We review the issues involved in designing a mechanism for allocating resource rights. We focus on the case of exploration and development rights for oil and gas leases in U.S. federal lands to highlight the tradeoffs at play. The main issues concern the design of the lease contract, the design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332118

How to sell in a sequential auction market

Hendricks, Kenneth; Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1451-1471

We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N ≥ 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536969

Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price

Hendricks, Kenneth - 1990

The paper analyzes a first price, sealed bid auction with a random reservation price where the object has an unknown common value, but one buyer has better information than the others. We permit the reservation price to be correlated with the information of the informed buyer, which reflects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235725

Essays on multi-item auctions : theorectical and empirical investigations

Sibley, David S. (contributor); … - 2011

In this dissertation, I explore bidders’ behavior in multiple auctions which are conducted sequentially or … auctions and show that the wildly-used assumption of proxy bidding is inappropriate in the multiple auction setting. The first … auctions are more likely to win and have higher payoffs than proxy bidders. The third essay studies the procurement auctions in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009429272