We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations.Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence.

We apply the procedure to both existing and new classes of cooperative situations: sequencing situations without initial ordering, maintenance problems, minimum cost spanning tree situations, travelling salesman problems, shared taxi problems and travelling repairman problems.

In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games.This value turns out to have a nice interpretation.We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game.

In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are...

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the best- reply multifunctions can take in 2×2×2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2×2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents’ pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set.

In this paper we introduce a property of balanced contributions in the context of multi-issue allocation situations.Using this property, we characterise the run-to-thebank rule for multi-issue allocation situations.

In this paper we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games.These solutions extend bankruptcy rules.In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and characterise...