We compare the alternative approaches for regulating genetic information in the health insurance market when prevention measures are available. In the model, firms offer insurance contracts to consumers who are initially uninformed of their risk type but can obtain such information by performing...

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to...

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to...

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to...

We analyze mutual insurance arrangements (policies based on risk-sharing among a pool of policyholders) when consumers choose a self-insurance effort, that is an effort decreasing the size of any loss occurring. We consider both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies in the effort choice....

We develop a model where consumers do not have ex-ante private information on their risk but can decide to acquire such information before insurance policy purchase. Adverse selection can arise endogenouslyin the insurance market. We focus on the case where information has decision-making value:...