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Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference doesasymmetric information in bargaining make?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning thesize of a pie on proposer behavior in three different … bargaining situations:the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game.Our data show that (a) irrespective of the … information condition, proposergenerosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informedproposers in the ultimatum game try to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866401

Coordination in a Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring

Gerber, Anke; Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2006

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005859323

Committing to Incentives: Should the Decision to Sanctionbe Revealed or Hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships.While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions,it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce complianceby crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We add...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022160

Evolution in Imperfect Commitment Bargaining– Strategic versus Ignorant Types

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one–sided early commitment power the … simultaneouslythe (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining solution, however, predicts (moreor less) equal shares. Relying on a continuous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866908

Optimal Product Design : A CAPM approach

Rieger, Marc Oliver; Wang, Mei; Hens, Thorsten - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2006

We study properties of structured ﬁnancial products optimizing a utility functional of a customer. The conventional method may have the disadvantage that the a priori restriction to a certain number of assets could make it impossible to ﬁnd the optimal portfolio. So instead of optimizing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858026

Money and Reciprocity

Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2003

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. Weshow that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided everyparticipant considers accepting money as a reasonable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858586

On the Micro-foundations of Money : The Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op

Hens, Thorsten; Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2003

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralizedmarkets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationarymonetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity ofmoney. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual be-havior in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858589

Equity versus Efficiency?– Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments –

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870886

Does Entitlement Crowd Out Efficiency or EqualitySeeking?- Selling the Roles in Generosity Game Experiments -

Güth, Werner; Bäker, Agnes; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

.Interpreting participants' willingness to pay as an aspiration level of how muchthey want to earn, our design further allows us to test for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248901

Nash Competive Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation

Hens, Thorsten; Reimann, Stefan; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107