In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restrictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. Price rigidities may cause that a competitive equilibrium cannot be attained, and rationing on net demands or supplies is needed to clear...

In the wide and increasing attention for the so-called "new economy", two, not necessarily compatible, issues meet the eye. Firstly, most discussions apply macro-economic concepts, yet secondly their general gist is that the new economy demands new tools for analysis. In this paper, the existing...

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictionsand that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set ofadmissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannotbe guaranteed that...

The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...

Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a number of universally stable adjustment processes. In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium. Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium selection...

Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both non-cooperative and cooperative games. We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for...

The general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets provides a unified framework for many problems in finance and macroeconomics. In its simplest version with only two time periods and a single physical commodity the model is ideally suited for the study of problems in cross sectional...

By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition that is a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-known that balancedness is a...

It is well--known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be...