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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2008
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are …-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity … proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure we define a collection of spanning trees, where each spanning tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723213
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2008
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are …-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity … proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure we define a collection of spanning trees, where each spanning tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723255
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The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2006
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle …-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027350
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only …-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity. …This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2010, 68, 626-633. <P> We study …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465
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The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-free Graph Games
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle …-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256394
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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298
formation games with positive spillovers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977
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Risk Allocation under Liquidity Constraints
Csoka, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2013
Risk allocation games are cooperative games that are used to attribute the risk of a financial entity to its divisions …. In this paper, we extend the literature on risk allocation games by incorporating liquidity considerations. A liquidity … class of transferable utility games coincides with the class of totally balanced games. It follows from our results that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699525
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Risk allocation under liquidity constraints
Csóka, Péter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - In: Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) C, pp. 1-9
Risk allocation games are cooperative games that are used to attribute the risk of a financial entity to its divisions …. In this paper, we extend the literature on risk allocation games by incorporating liquidity considerations. A liquidity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011118105
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Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies
Habis, Helga; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2011
We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644193
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Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty
Habis, Helga; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2011
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644194