ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

vector of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement of the core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core and the payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection of graphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core. <BR><BR> We conclude by some examples showing the …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that … the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power. The socially stable core is the set of … socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a … possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core … concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core …