The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and allows for intermediate cases with some restrictions on...

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictionsand that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set ofadmissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannotbe guaranteed that...

Coherent measures of risk defined by the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance are recent tools in risk management to assess the amount of risk agents are exposed to. If they also satisfy law invariance and comonotonic additivity, then we get a...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...