Similar Search Results

Contracting between sophisticated parties : a more complete view of incomplete contracts and their breach

Hermalin, Benjamin E.; Katz, Michael L. - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000813436

Hermalin, Benjamin E.; Katz, Avery W.; Craswell, Richard - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 1, (pp. 3-138). 2007

This chapter surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory … law of contracts. These divisions include freedom of contract (the extent of private power to create binding obligations …), formation of contracts (the procedural mechanics of exchange, and the rules that govern pre-contractual behavior), contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023515

Vague terms : contracting when precision in terms is infeasible

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 76-94

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666868

Chapter 2. Aspects of the Economics of Organization with Application to Corporate Governance

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2017

This chapter provides a critical review and survey of aspects of formal and informal contracting particularly relevant to the study of corporate governance. Two types of modeling, hidden-information agency and informal (relational) contracting that are perhaps under-utilized in governance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023373

Contract renegotiation in agency problems

Edlin, Aaron S.; Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000633184

Moral hazard and verifiability : the effects of renegotiation in agency

Hermalin, Benjamin E. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 59 (1991) 6, pp. 1735-1753

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001115924

Contract renegotiation and options in agency problems

Edlin, Aaron S.; Hermalin, Benjamin E. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 16 (2000) 2, pp. 395-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001520185

Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems

Edlin, Aaron S.; Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 1998

This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can holdup the agent,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206728

Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems

Edlin, Aaron S. - 1997

procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472728

Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems

Edlin, Aaron S. - 2010

procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763577