Frydman and Jin (2022) ["Efficient coding and risky choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137, 161---213] present a model of efficient coding whereby decision makers are Bayesian learners of a stochastic distribution. The model predicts that decision makers will devote more cognitive...

Frydman and Jin (2022) ["Efficient coding and risky choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137, 161---213] present a model of efficient coding whereby decision makers are Bayesian learners of a stochastic distribution. The model predicts that decision makers will devote more cognitive...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, unlike the classic cheap talk setup, the...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...

Frydman and Jin (2022) ["Efficient coding and risky choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137, 161---213] present a model of efficient coding whereby decision makers are Bayesian learners of a stochastic distribution. The model predicts that decision makers will devote more cognitive...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, unlike the classic cheap talk setup, the...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...