Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and … Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation under the constraint that sellers are protected by …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award … procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under …

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and … Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation under the constraint that sellers are protected by …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award … procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price …

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …