In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether — as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium — costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...

In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that...

In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether, as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium, costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...

We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. In particular, regardless of the number...

We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We analyze how the structure of the private information shapes the market power of each agent and the price volatility. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium...

We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade.We establish our results by providing a characterization of...

We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade.We establish our results by providing a characterization of...

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...