institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the … democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 … depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time …

resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial … development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions …, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We test our theoretical predictions systematically …

We hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak … countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We provide … financial development and political institutions. …

resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise.  As poor contract enforcement leads to low … institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions.  We test our theoretical predictions … development and political institutions, as well as across different samples and data frequencies.  We present further evidence …

resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial … development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions …, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We test our theoretical predictions systematically …

resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial … development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions …, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We test our theoretic predictions systematically …

resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial … development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions …, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We test our theoretical predictions systematically …