We look at the implications of uncertain monetary policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approach to monetary stability. It turns out that in presence of uncertain preferences a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh (1995) performs better in terms of social welfare than...

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker.It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and...

In Rogoff (1985) it is shown that society can make itself better off by appointing a central banker who places an additional weight on in ation rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization. Using an envelope theorem, Rogoff shows that this additional weight must be positive and...

This paper analyzes the effect of monetary uncertainty on the inflationary bias and the variance of output and inflation. Monetary policy uncertainty is modeled as a shock to the central banker’s preference for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization that cannot be observed by...

This paper develops a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered. The first one is transparency of actual monetary policy, the second aspect is the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. Monetary policy is transparent if there is...