Exit theory predicts a governance role of outside blockholders' exit threats; but this role could be ineffective if managers' potential private benefits exceed their loss in stock-price declines caused by outside blockholders' exit. We test this prediction using the Split-Share Structure Reform...

Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms’ corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the different types of large...

Using a large hand-collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This...

Using an extensive panel of cross-border Mamp;A transactions between 1990 and 2007, we find that firms from developing countries (versus those from developed countries) bid higher on average to acquire assets in developed countries. We are interested in why these higher bids occur. We find that...

Using an extensive panel of cross-border M&A transactions between 1990 and 2007, we find that firms from developing countries (versus those from developed countries) bid higher on average to acquire assets in developed countries. We are interested in why these higher bids occur. We find that...