equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a … fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb …

We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We … experience that the time average of play often converges in these “unstable” games, even while mixed strategies and beliefs … continue to cycle. This time average is related to the best response cycle first identified by Shapley (1964). For many games …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a … fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb …

strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but in one game the NE is stable …

games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects … played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 ´ 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The …