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An empirical test of auction efficiency : evidence from MBS auctions of the Federal Reserve
Bonaldi, Pietro; Hortaçsu, Ali; Song, Zhaogang - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410094
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Bid shading and bidder surplus in the U.S. Treasury auction system
Hortaçsu, Ali; Kastl, Jakub; Zhang, Allen - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773006
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Bid shading and bidder surplus in the US treasury auction system
Hortaçsu, Ali; Kastl, Jakub; Zhang, Allen - In: The American economic review 108 (2018) 1, pp. 147-169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011820451
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Auctions in the Journal of political economy, 1894-2017
Hortaçsu, Ali - In: Journal of political economy 125 (2017) 6, pp. 1915-1920
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011833410
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Winner curse, reserve prices and endogenous entry : empirical insights from eBay auctions
Bajari, Patrick; Hortaçsu, Ali - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001517239
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The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry : empirical insights from eBay auctions
Bajari, Patrick L.; Hortaçsu, Ali - In: The Rand journal of economics 34 (2003) 2, pp. 329-355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001782735
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The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry : empirical insights from eBay auctions
Bajari, Patrick L. (contributor); Hortaçsu, Ali (contributor) - In: Workshop on the Economics of Information and Network …. 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001785429
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Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions : an empirical analysis of the Turkish Treasury auction markets
Hortaçsu, Ali; McAdams, David - In: Journal of political economy 118 (2010) 5, pp. 833-865
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009238313
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Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the U.S. Treasury Auction System
Hortaçsu, Ali - 2017
We analyze bidding data from uniform price auctions of U.S. Treasury bills and notes between July 2009-October 2013. Primary dealers consistently bid higher yields compared to direct and indirect bidders. We estimate a structural model of bidding that takes into account informational asymmetries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453689