We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) and relax the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences. We show that initial holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization. Equilibria other than such maximizers can be...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...

Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding tomilitant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. The wagedynamics are linear if strike is credible (low wage shares) and...