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Maximal cartel pricing and leniency programs

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377398

The effects of leniency on maximal cartel pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009

collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378956

The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2014

linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433900

Legal principles in antitrust enforcement

Houba, Harold - 2013 - Revised version: August 2013

welfare under these legal principles. The optimal fine schedule remains below the maximum fine and induces collusion on a … lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. For a range of low cartel prices, the fine is set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224778