We include initial holdings in the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Economic Journal, 2007) in which the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic welfare maximization. When we relax assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, equilibria other than lexicographic welfare...

We introduce the notion of a stone age equilibrium to study societies in which property rights are absent, bilateral exchange is either coercive or voluntary, and relative strength governs power relations in coercive exchange. We stress the importance of free disposal of goods which allows for...

Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyze whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing, or sustainable. We do so using...

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001380">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>.<p>Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints....</p></a>

We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the last decade due to increasing concerns over water scarcity and pollution. We outline the major approaches and pay specific attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary...

We model market power in water markets as multi-market Cournot competition with a river structure. Suppliers are connected through water balances, which imposes resource constraints, and they are connected to heterogeneous water users via a water delivery infrastructure. Our model captures a...