We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care...

We describe the structure and present situation of the Chinese healthcare system and discuss its primary problems and challenges. We discuss problems with inefficient burden sharing, adverse provider incentives and huge inequities, and seek explanations in the structural features of the Chinese...

In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity...

In a recent paper Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999) suggest the use of a new potential improvements approach to efficiency evaluation which has the advantage of separating the issue of benchmark selection from the issue of efficiency measurement. In the present paper the potential improvements...

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of reward sharing schemes in mining pools, such as those associated with Bitcoin. The framework is centered around the reported shares in a pool instead of agents and introduces two new fairness criteria: absolute and relative...

In river systems, costly upstream pollution abatement creates downstream welfare gains. Without a central authority to enforce such abatement, the welfare gains can only be realized if downstream regions compensate for the upstream abatement. We develop a model that makes explicit the impact of...

We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents...