The problem of demand inversion -- a crucial step in the estimation of randomutility discrete-choice models -- is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes intwo-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility models that are notnecessarily additive, smooth, nor even...

We propose an alternative notion of non-transferable utility (NTU) stability in matching models that relies on money burning. Our model captures an exchange economy with indivisible goods, fixed prices, and no centralized assignment mechanism. In these models, a non-transferable numeraire (e.g.,...

Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers,...

We propose a new class of hedonic models with sticky prices and queues. Time replaces money as the invisible hand in the market. Unlike money, time is non-transferable to the trading partner. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and we compare our model with the standard...