In this papaer we, first, by explicitly taking account of the private sectors influence and pressure on the monetary authorities, provide a more plausible representation of the motivations of the two main players. We then incorporate persistence into the model and show that the optimal policy of...

In this paper we construct a rational expectations model based on a Phillips curve that embodies persistence in inflation. As we assume that the central bank targets the natural rate of output, there is no inflation bias. We derive optimal monetary policy rules that are state-contingent and...

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR). In a simple one-period setting, the Central Bank (CB) should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for ¶too big to fail¶. In a dynamic setting, the CBs optimal LOLR policy is time...

In a monetary game played by he private sector and a central banks (CB), who has private information, reputation may not completely solver the CB time inconsistency problem. An alternative solution is CB Conservativeness. The optimal degree of CB Conservativeness is solved in both the...

This paper develops a simple model of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The World economy consists of many open economies, each with its own banking system and its own central bank which uses its reserves to manage a pegged exchange rate. The fragility of the banking system and the...