Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 19
Cover Image
Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2001
This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419524
Cover Image
Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684811
Cover Image
Social norms and economic incentives in firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (2012) 2, pp. 173-185
a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048116
Cover Image
Social norms and economic incentives in firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2010
a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277225
Cover Image
Social norms and optimal incentives in firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - 2001
This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281285
Cover Image
More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Bohnet, Iris; Frey, Bruno S.; Huck, Steffen - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585611
Cover Image
Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - 2001
This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334848
Cover Image
Social norms and optimal incentives in firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649440
Cover Image
Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
Cover Image
Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485541