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In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340265
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342145
avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011751477
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303
-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero …, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261943
-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero …, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822891
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001430563
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015204089
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009157202