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Trust, treason, and trials : an example of how the evolution of preferences can be driven by legal institutions

Huck, Steffen - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 14 (1998) 1, pp. 44-60

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001238099

Legal design and the evolution of remorse

Huck, Steffen - In: Cognition, rationality, and institutions, (pp. 65-85). 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001516378

Two are few and four are many : number effects in experimental oligopolies

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - 2001

. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539897

Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior : theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

Apesteguia, Joe; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; … - 2007

actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593007

Imitation : theory and experimental evidence

Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - 2005

laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003023525

Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence

Apesteguia, José; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg - 2003

. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270576

Trust, Treason, and Trials--An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions

Huck, Steffen - 1998

This study tries to enlarge the scope of law and economics by providing an example that legal institutions do not only have short-run effects on present behavior by changing the cost-benefit relation of different actions but can also drive the evolution of preferences. Therefore, legal design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070143