Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract … negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains … market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract … negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains … market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract … negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains … market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which …

explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are … substitutes. We show, however, that trust can be a complement, mattering more when contract enforcement is stronger. Our evidence …

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor … much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment …