the context of a model of costly signaling with two types of agents: conditionally cooperative (“good”) and uncooperative … signaling the presence of one more good type, this may lead other good types to contribute more in future, more important … dissuade bad types from signaling. In contrast, if the institution is anonymous, so that it reveals only the total number of …

Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in religion and ritual … signaling may then be prohibitively costly. If the average level of signaling in a group is observable, but individual effort is … commitment among the group. We develop a formal model, and give examples of institutions that enable anonymous signaling …

Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in religion and ritual …. But if the signal's cost is too small, freeriders will send the signal and behave selflshly later. Effective signaling may … then be prohibitively costly. If the average level of signaling in a group is observable, but individual effort is not …

Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in religion and ritual …. But if the signal’s cost is too small, freeriders will send the signal and behave selfishly later. Effective signaling may … then be prohibitively costly. If the average level of signaling in a group is observable, but individual effort is not …

-link structure. We test the implications of our model in a laboratory experiment. -- cooperation ; conflict, defence ; signaling …