The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both "internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.

The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both "internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced...

This note studies an exchange economy in which there are n traders and n “kinds” of commodities. Each trader has n utility functions corresponding to n “kinds” of commodities, respectively. Thus, a multiple non-transferable utility game can be derived from this exchange economy. It is...

The main focus of this note is on the interval Shapley value for interval games introduced by Alparslan Gök et al. (Cent. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 18:131–140, <CitationRef CitationID="CR4">2010</CitationRef>). In the framework of interval games, we introduce the potential approach and prove that the interval Shapley value can be formulated...</citationref>

In this paper, we provide two characterizations in the context of NTU games: of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core. The first characterization is based on reduced games and contraction and expansion independence. The second one is based on reduced games and sub-reduced games....

We show that the lexicographic maximin solution is the only solution that satisfies the axioms of Pareto optimality, comprehensive hull axiom and duplicated individual monotonicity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999

We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core to the context of multi-choice NTU games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005