The English rule of court cost allocation only allows costs that are deemed to be 'necessary' or 'proper' for the attainment of justice to be shifted from the winner to the loser at trial. We model litigants who optimize with respect to the level of legal inuts they use, and compare the...

Vander Veen (1995) has argued that a principal has an incentive to monitor risk averse agents engaging in team production. We show that this result rests on specific informational assumptions that are not essential to team production. Moreover, under typical team environments and contract...

We derive conditions under which all sellers bargain in (the Nash) equilibrium and yet other conditions under which all sellers post fixed prices. Some fraction of buyers have zero search costs but buyers are otherwise identical.

The access price is the charge that a network manager charges to other firms to carry traffic (whether it initiates it or finalizes it) through the network. This charge has gained importance as the regulation of formerly vertically integrated monopolies in some industries has opened them, at...

A new technique for estimating market power in several markets simultaneously is developed and applied to the Australian retail beef, lamb, and pork markets. Some support is found for the restriction that market power is the same for each meat. Given equal market power in all three meats, we...

We examine lending and bidding when bidders, whose valuation for the good and wealth are private information, must borrow to fund their bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Any separating equilibrium is unique and the winning bidder typw randomnizes their bids.

It has been shown that if buyers have zero search cost and the remainder a common positive search cost, and sellers post prices, then there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium-sellers choose a price distribution. We show that increasing the number of search cost types results in another...