Wir untersuchen die Rolle von Vertragstypen und Zugangsregulierung auf Innovation und Wettbewerb. In einem Duopolmodell zeigen wir, dass Ex-post-Verträge, die nach den Investitionsentscheidungen getroffen werden, zu einer Welt führen, in der seltener Infrastruktur dupliziert wird, in der es...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

We analyze the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, we show that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of investment,...

This paper analyzes the role of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in telecommunications in the context of Next Generation Access Networks. Within a standard duopoly model, it is shown that ex-post access contracts lead less often to the duplication of...

Contractual and regulatory provisions for access affect incentives to invest in an upgraded network and, in particular, a next-generation access network. Investment decisions are made under uncertainty and have to be made over time. This papers provides a framework for taking uncertainty, risk...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

We characterize a monopolist's optimal offer of service plans when only informed customers know already at the contracting stage whether their demand is high or low, while uninformed customers may learn their demand only after incurring some costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase...

Wir untersuchen die Rolle von Vertragstypen und Zugangsregulierung auf Innovation und Wettbewerb. In einem Duopolmodell zeigen wir, dass Ex-post-Verträge, die nach den Investitionsentscheidungen getroffen werden, zu einer Welt führen, in der seltener Infrastruktur dupliziert wird, in der es...