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The Moonlighting Game An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution
Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - 2001
evidence that they also encourage reciprocity. Keyword(s): Reciprocity; Retribution; Fairness; Non-binding contracts …-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of making non-binding contracts beforehand. We find that retribution … is much more compelling than reciprocity. Although contracts are not binding they increase trust, but we do not find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141311
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Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options : conference paper
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013
We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338950
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Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191262
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Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike - 2013
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074889
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An Experimental Bribery Game
Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2 … exclusion from the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocity establishes bribery relationships, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968325
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Sabotage in tournaments: evidence from a laboratory experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268946
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Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980267
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Sabotage in Tournaments:Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2009
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical dataon induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868022
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Sabotage in tournaments : evidence from a laboratory experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009
curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output. -- Sabotage ; tournament ; reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003859419
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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371183