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In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324357
In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968461
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005316964
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005224919
In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011540075
The behavioural approach can be applied to both the design of an auction as well as to the implementation of a bidding strategy. This paper reports a case study in which we assisted a bidder in the German DCS1800 auction in the preparation for its bidding. We describe the various steps on this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001714776
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We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. One-shot experiments were performed on this game. Treatments were conducted with and without making non-binding agreements beforehand. The results refute...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968245
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968325