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Steigern variable Löhne die Leistung?
Sliwka, Dirk; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2003
Die vorliegende Studie beleuchtet das Problem der Motivationsverdrängung bei Anreizsetzung durch Stücklöhne. Modelliert wird eine einfache experimentelle Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehung. In einer ersten Bedingung kann der Prinzipal einen fixen Transfer an einen Agenten leisten. In einer zweiten...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845885
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Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2003
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601
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Disclosure, trust and persuasion in insurance markets
de Meza, David; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Reyniers, Diane - 2010
trusting plays an important role. Trust is clearly associated with greater willingness to pay for insurance. Unlike in previous … work, trust in our setting is not about obligations being fulfilled. The contract is complete, simple and the possibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285436
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Identifying Personality Traits to Enhance Trust between Organisations – An Experimental Approach
Fahr, René; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Universität <Köln> / Seminar für Allgemeine … - 2006
We investigate an experimental representatives’ trust game which resembles trust relation-ships between representatives … in a trust game. Detailed personality profiles are derived and it is shown that they differ significantly between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868023
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Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2021
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals' payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319706
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Incentives, decision frames, and motivation crowding out: an experimental investigation
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2005
A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267365
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Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2003
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261580
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Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals’ payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233886
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Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström’s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents’ unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566413
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Incentives, Decision Frames, and Motivation Crowding Out - An Experimental Investigation
Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948