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Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - University of Bonn, Germany - 1999

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2 … negative externalities have no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reduces corruption, although discovery …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968325

Corrupted by Algorithms? How Ai-Generated and Human-Written Advice Shape (Dis)Honesty

Leib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - 2023

Artificial Intelligence (AI) increasingly becomes an indispensable advisor. New ethical concerns arise if AI persuades people to behave dishonestly. In an experiment, we study how AI advice (generated by a Natural-Language-processing algorithm) affects (dis)honesty, compare it to equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014346985

Corrupted by algorithms? : how AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty

Leib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014311663

Replication report: corrupted by algorithms? : how AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty

Deer, Lachlan; Krishna, Adithya; Zhang, Le - 2025

Leib et al. (2024) examine how artificial intelligence (AI) generated advice affects dishonesty compared to equivalent human advice in a laboratory experiment. In their preferred empirical specification, the authors report that dishonesty-promoting advice increases dishonest behavior by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332898

How to hire helpers? : evidence from a field experiment

Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Reggiani, Tommaso; … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 19 (2016) 3, pp. 577-594

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659725

An experimental Bribery game

Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001454331

An experimental bribery game

Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 18 (2002) 2, pp. 428-454

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001704696

An Experimental Bribery Game

Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - 2010

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocity relationships between bribers and public officials, (2 … negative externalities have no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reduces corruption, although discovery …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116732

When leading by example leads to less corrupt collaboration

Rilke, Rainer Michael; Danilov, Anastasia; Weisel, Ori; … - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 188 (2021), pp. 288-306

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012658728

Do two bribe less than one? : an experimental study on the four-eyes-principle

Bodenschatz, Anja; Irlenbusch, Bernd - In: Applied economics letters 26 (2019) 3, pp. 191-195

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012204163