In 2000, Ramadan school vacation coincided with the original annual exam period of December in Bangladesh. This forced schools to pre-pone their final exam schedules in November, which was the month before the harvest begins. 'Ramadan 2000' is a natural experiment that reduced the labor demand...

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh,...

This paper explores whether a worker's unwillingness to make his/her HIV-positive status or test-taking experience known by colleagues impedes his/her decision to test for HIV. After analyzing the new survey data provided by employees working for a large multinational enterprise in South Africa...

Using a unique dataset obtained from rural Andhra Pradesh, India that contains direct observations of household access to credit and detailed time use, results of this study indicate that credit market failures lead to a substantial reallocation of time used by children for activities such as...

This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions,...

It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based...

We propose the bounds on ATE using intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator when there are compliers/noncompliers in randomized trials. The bounds are given as ITT<ATE<CACE, where compliers’ average treatment effect (CACE) can be computed from ITT and complier ratio. We show that these bounds can be derived from two assumptions: (1) average treatment effect is greater with compliers than noncompliers or CACE>NACE, (2) noncompliers' average treatment effect (NACE) is nonnegative. We give an example of poverty impacts of health insurance, and...</ate<cace,>