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'Buy-it-Now' or 'Sell-it-Now' Auctions : Effects of Changing Bargaining Power in Sequential Trading Mechanisms
Grebe, Tim - 2016
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000430
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'Buy-it-Now' or 'Sell-it-Now' Auctions : Effects of Changing Bargaining Power in Sequential Trading Mechanisms
Grebe, Tim - 2015
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009500
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'Buy-it-Now' or 'Sell-it-Now' Auctions : Effects of Changing Bargaining Power in Sequential Trading Mechanisms
Grebe, Tim - 2015
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013010593
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Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012
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Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin G. - 2022
Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467730
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Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023
bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862
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Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309999
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Auctions and fair division games: A cross-cultural bidding experiment
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2000
This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Germany and Bulgaria, and for different allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid function in both countries,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310180
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Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310347
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Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron - 2001
We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310360