We consider a game G(n) played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z(1),...,Z(n), each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations z :=...

We examine product-games, which are n-player stochastic games satisfying: (1) the state space is a product S(1)×…×S(n); (2) the action space of any player i only depends of the i-th coordinate of the state; (3) the transition probability of moving from s(i) ∈ S(i) to t(i) ∈S(i), on the...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an...

We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents’ actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...

We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. With respect to the...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where cho-sen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales.This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high pricesonly to be possible as an...

We investigate the problem in which an agent has to find an object that moves between two locations according to a discrete Markov process (see Pollock, 1970). At every period, the agent has three options: searching left, searching right, and waiting. We assume that waiting is costless whereas...

This paper lays down conceptual groundwork for optimal choice of a decision maker facing afinite-state Markov decision problem on an infinite horizon. We distinguish two notions of astrategy being favored on the limit of horizons, and examine the properties of the emerging binaryrelations. After...

We investigate the relations between different types of perfect equilibrium, introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium in this context, the classical "trembling...

We prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies...