Combinatorial auctions permitting bids on bundles of items have been developed to remedy the exposure problem associated with single-item auctions. Given winning bundle prices a set of item prices is called market clearing or equilibrium if all the winning (losing) bids are greater (less) than...

In the given research we study a leadership formation of the most influential nodes in networks. Specifically, we analyze the competition between a leader and a follower based on the Stackelberg leadership model. Applying the concept of Shapley value to measure node’s importance, we represent...

In this paper we will study statistical equilibria in commodity markets where agents have a specified utility attached to every transaction in their offer sets. A probability measure on the product of all offer sets is called benefit efficient if market transactions with higher total benefit are...

We study the problem of allocating the total profit of a production enterprise among the resource owners, using the game-theoretic framework introduced by Owen [Owen, G., 1975. On the core of linear production games. Mathematical Programming 9, 358-370]. We provide lower (upper) bounds on the...

In this paper, we consider the newsvendor model under partial information, i.e., where the demand distribution D is partly unknown. We focus on the classical case where the retailer only knows the expectation and variance of D. The standard approach is then to determine the order quantity using...