Teams face a variety of strategic circumstances, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in productive but not in corrupt ones. Understanding the behavior and social impact of teams requires understanding how cooperation in one situation depends on expectations of cooperation in...

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. An agent's payoff decreases with the mismatch between...

We study the evolution of the social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents'...

We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. There are complementarities in...

We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. There are complementarities in...

We study the evolution of a social norm of `cooperation' in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents'...

We investigate the complementarity between informal communities and formal government enforcement of norms of reciprocation and exchange. We introduce a model in which people exchange informally within their community as well as externally on a market. We show that informal community and formal...

We analyze the optimal length of political terms (equivalently, the optimal frequency with which elections should be held) when the candidates of two polarized parties compete for office and the median voter shifts over time. Office-holders determine policy and experience persistent random...

We analyze dynamic electoral competition policy changes. The costs of changing a policy increase with the extent of the shift and generate an incumbency advantage. We characterize the dynamics of Markov equilibria in terms of history and party polarization, and analyze how policies are...