People have been shown to engage in favor-trading when it is efficiency-enhancing to do so. Will they also trade favors when it reduces efficiency, as in a series of wasteful public projects that each benefits an individual? We introduce the “Stakeholder Public Bad” game to study this...

Grassroots fundraising leverages favor trading in social networks to support the provision of a public good. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of this type of institution. Peer-to-peer reciprocity is important, and having the ability to practice targeted...

Temporal spillovers occur when a conservation program changes what happens to land outside the temporal window of the conservation contract. This may happen when conservation improves land so that returns to non-conservation uses are increased, or when landowners' preferences become more...

Temporal spillovers occur when a conservation program changes the use made of a land parcel outside of the window of the conservation contract. This may happen when conservation improves land so that returns to non-conservation uses are increased, or when landowners' preferences become more...

We develop an axiomatic theory that integrates the discovered preference hypothesis into neoclassical microeconomic choice theory. A theory in which preferences must be discovered through experience can explain patterns observed in choice data, including preference reversals, evolution of or...

We use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse. We look at a price mechanism, specifically a Pigouvian subsidy, and four non-price interventions. The non-price policies are information alone, information with a normative message, communication alone, and...

Some policy problems pit the interests of one group against those of another group. One group may, for example, determine the provision of a project (such as a power plant or a dam) that benefits group members but has downstream externalities that hurt people outside the group. We introduce a...

People trade favors when doing so increases efficiency. Will they when it reduces efficiency, such as in political logrolling? We introduce the "Stakeholder Public Bad" game, in which common fund contributions increase one person’s earnings (the "Stakeholder") while reducing others'...

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect...