Showing 1 - 10 of 17
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This paper shows that Rubinstein’s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040849
This paper distinguishes between two scenarios for the expert-client encounter. In the cure scenario, the client does not know whether a loss can be recovered. In the prevention scenario, the client faces a threat but does not know whether this threat is real enough to justify preventive action....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040868
Benchmark two-good utility functions involving a good with zero income elasticity and unit income elasticity are well known. This paper derives utility functions for the additional benchmark cases where one good has zero cross-price elasticity, unit own-price elasticity, and zero own price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040910
This paper develops a framework for empirically testing several alternative game-theoretic rationales for Horn’s rule. It then presents an economic laboratory experiment where these rationales are empirically tested. Subjects seem to coordinate on Horn’s rule where efficiency acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040915
The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players’ mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040920
In the two-way flow connections model of the seminal paper by Bala and Goyal (2000a), the marginal benefit of obtaining the information of one more player is constant. However, it is plausible that the marginal benefit of such information is decreasing. This paper explores the consequences for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040953
Economists usually describe goods as being either (gross) complements or (gross) substitutes. Yet, what is less known is that one good may be a gross substitute for a second good, while the second good is a gross complement to the first good. This paper shows the existence of asymmetric gross...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040965
As shown by Rubinstein (1989, AER), in the two-player electronic mail game, players are better off if the extent to which they can check each other’s information, check each other’s information about each other’s information, etc., is limited. This paper investigates to what...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040990