The set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation (Bala and Goyal, 2000) is very sensitive to the introduction of decay. Even if decay is small enough so that equilibrium networks are minimal, the set of equilibrium architectures becomes much richer, especially when...

The set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation (Bala and Goyal, 2000) is very sensitive to the introduction of decay. Even if decay is small enough so that equilibrium networks are minimal, the set of equilibrium architectures becomes much richer, especially when...

This paper shows that Rubinstein’s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.

This paper distinguishes between two scenarios for the expert-client encounter. In the cure scenario, the client does not know whether a loss can be recovered. In the prevention scenario, the client faces a threat but does not know whether this threat is real enough to justify preventive action....

Benchmark two-good utility functions involving a good with zero income elasticity and unit income elasticity are well known. This paper derives utility functions for the additional benchmark cases where one good has zero cross-price elasticity, unit own-price elasticity, and zero own price...