Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks—multi-sided matching markets with bilateral contracts and without transferable utility—under the assumption...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

Admission to universities is organised in a centralised scheme in Hungary. In this paper we investigate two major specialities of this application: ties and common quotas. A tie occur when some students have the same score at a programme. If not enough seats are available for the last tied group...

When two students with the same score are competing for the last slot at a university programme in a central admission scheme then different policies may apply across countries. In Ireland only one of these students is admitted by a lottery. In Chile both students are admitted by slightly...