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Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781529

Information acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Liu, Ting; Wang, Tao - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698549

Information acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Liu, Ting; Wang, Tao - 2016

We study firms' incentives to acquire private information in a setting where subsequent competition leads to firms' later signaling their private information to rivals. Due to signaling, equilibrium prices are distorted, and so while firms benefit from obtaining more precise private information,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548620

Information acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Liu, Ting; Wang, Tao - In: International journal of industrial organization 61 (2018), pp. 155-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103418

Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals

De Silva, Dakshina G. - 2010

In many procurement auctions bidders do not know how many rivals they face at the time that they incur the cost of … preparing their bids.We show in a theoretical model that regardless of whether the procurement is characterized by private or by … common values an increase in the potential number of bidders may lead to higher procurement costs. This raises potential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143264

Endogenous entry in markets with unobserved quality

Creane, Anthony; Jeitschko, Thomas D. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009737011

Welfare effects of certification under latent adverse selection

Creane, Anthony; Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Sim, Kyoungbo - 2019

Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associated with perfectly competitive market outcomes: the "lemons" market. Credible certification, that substantiates unobservable characteristics of products that consumers value, is often considered a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987160

Endogenous entry in markets with unobserved quality

Creane, Anthony; Jeitschko, Thomas D. - In: The journal of industrial economics 64 (2016) 3, pp. 494-519

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574445

Equilibrium price paths in a sequential auctions with stochastic supply

Jeitschko, Thomas D. - In: Economics letters 64 (1999) 1, pp. 67-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001399187

Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001470251