Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Word-of-mouth, referral, or viral marketing is a highly sought-after way of advertising. We undertake a field experiment that compares incentive mechanisms for encouraging social media shares to support a given cause. Our experiment takes place on a website set up to promote a fundraising drive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333277
We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287724
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005856146
In this paper, we address the problem of convergence to Nash equilibria in games with rewards that are initially unknown and which must be estimated over time from noisy observations. These games arise in many real-world applications, whenever rewards for actions cannot be prespecified and must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010857365
Word-of-mouth, referral, or viral marketing is a highly sought-after way of advertising. We undertake a field experiment that compares incentive mechanisms for encouraging social media shares to support a given cause. Our experiment takes place on a website set up to promote a fundraising drive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959716
In this paper, we address the problem of convergence to Nash equilibria in games with rewards that are initially unknown and which must be estimated over time from noisy observations. These games arise in many real-world applications, whenever rewards for actions cannot be prespecified and must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533717
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006509776
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008127488
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive-compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e. maximise social utility) and individually rational (i.e. agents prefer to join rather than opt out)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747080
We analyse assignment problems in which not every agent is controlled by the central planner. The autonomous agents search for vacant tasks guided by their own preference orders over available tasks. The goal of the central planner is to maximise the total value of the assignment, taking into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065208